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Abstract. This paper studies the decision of whether to apply for a patent in a dynamic model
in which rms innovate stochastically and independently. In the model, a rm can choose
between patenting and maintaining secrecy to protect a successful innovation. I consider
a legal environment characterized by imperfect patent protection and no prior user rights.
Thus, patenting grants probabilistic protection, and secrecy is e¤ectively maintained until
rivals innovate. I show that (1) rms that innovate early are more inclined to choose secrecy,
whereas rms that innovate late have a stronger tendency to patent; (2) the incentives
to patent increase with the innovation arrival rate; and (3) an increase in the number of
rms may cause patenting to occur earlier or later, depending on the strength of patent
protection. The socially optimal level of patent protection, which balances the trade-o¤
between the provision of patenting incentives and the avoidance of deadweight loss caused
by a monopoly, is lower with a higher innovation arrival rate or a larger number of rms.
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1 Introduction
An important strategic decision for a rm is how to protect innovations. The rm can
apply for patent protection or keep its innovation for secret use. Evidence indicates that
rms often make heterogeneous choices about whether to patent their innovations. In fact,
only a small proportion of innovations are patented (Scherer, 1965; Pakes and Griliches,
1980; Manseld, 1986), and secrecy is increasingly viewed as an important strategy for
appropriating innovations (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al., 2000). A question that naturally
arises is why some rms choose to apply for patents whereas others adopt secrecy to protect
their innovations. Moreover, given rmsstrategic decisions concerning whether to patent,
what is the socially optimal level of patent protection?
This paper attempts to address these questions. The analysis presented herein is mo-
tivated by several observed features concerning innovations and patenting. First, in many
situations, multiple rms are capable of independently devising similar or even identical in-
novations. As Varian et al. (2005) and Shapiro (2007) discuss, such duplication can occur
because rms often share common knowledge bases or nd their research paths restricted by
universal standards. Second, patent protection is probabilistic. Many patent applications are
not approved,1 and as Choi (1998) and Lemley and Shapiro (2005) emphasize, even issued
patents can be ruled invalid through litigation.2 Given the requirement for full disclosure of
innovation information during the patenting process, the information that is revealed may be
utilized to the benet of rival rms under conditions of imperfect patent protection. Third, a
rm that keeps an innovation secret runs the risk of allowing another rm to obtain a patent
for that innovation. Under current U.S. patent laws, a later inventor is permitted to obtain
a patent for an invention that was abandoned, suppressed or concealed by previous inventors
(Merges and Du¤y, 2007). In addition, U.S. patent laws grant no prior user rights,3 which
means that a later inventor has the right to exclude previous inventors that rely on secrecy.4
To capture these features, this paper develops a dynamic model of innovation in which
multiple rms stochastically and sequentially discover a technology that is critical to a cost-
1Of the 485,312 applications received in 2008, only 185,224 (less than 40%) patents were granted. Data
source: U.S. Patent Statistics Chart. http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/us_stat.htm.
2Allison and Lemley (1998) report that out of the 300 cases of nal validity decisions in their data set,
patents were declared invalid in 138 cases.
3With exceptions for business methods.
4As Denicolò and Franzoni (2004a) report in their discussion of Gore v. Garlock (721 F.2d 1540, 1983),
Garlock Inc. had discovered a process for creating a tape of unsintered polytetrauorethylene lament, but
decided to keep it secret. However, the process was later rediscovered by W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc.,
which succeeded in patenting it. In another case discussed in Marshall (1991), both New England Biolabs
and Bethesda Research Labs produced modied T7 DNA polymerase and o¤ered it for sale, but neither
applied for a patent. The patent for it was later granted to Harvard researchers who threatened the two labs
with a lawsuit for using it.
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reduction process or to the development of a new product. The rms that have discovered
the technology are referred to as innovators. When a discovery occurs, the innovator decides
whether to seek patent protection or rely on secrecy. Patent protection is imperfect in that
it is e¤ective with only some degree of probability. Moreover, the model assumes a legal
environment with no prior user rights (e.g. the U.S. patent system). Within this legal
environment, a later innovator may be entitled to the exclusive use of the technology if
previous innovators rely on secrecy protection.
Taking into account the uncertainty inherent in patent protection and the threat of inde-
pendent discoveries by rivals, an innovators choice between patenting and secrecy becomes
less than clear. In particular, by applying for a patent, an innovator that initially seeks to
exclude its competitors, may provide help to them by disclosing innovation information if
the patent protection is ine¤ective. Cohen et al. (2000) report such information disclosure
to be one of the main reasons for innovators not to seek patent protection. By adopting a
secrecy strategy, an innovator with the intention to gain an edge over its rivals may fail to
do so if these rivals are able to discover the technology independently within a short period
of time. As a matter of fact, blocking rivals from obtaining patents on related innovations
is often a motive for rms to patent.
In Section 3, I describe the equilibrium of the model and show how innovatorspatenting
decisions depend on the timing of discovery (whether the discovery occurs early or late),
the nature of an innovation (the innovation arrival rate) and the degree of market compe-
tition (the number of rms in the market). Early innovators are more inclined to choose
secrecy, whereas late innovators have a stronger tendency to opt for patents. In other words,
patenting incentives increase as more rms innovate. Consequently, given a certain level of
patent protection, in equilibrium, early innovators adopt secrecy and only a su¢ ciently late
innovator chooses to patent. A simple condition is provided to identify the critical innovator
that chooses to patent. Moreover, I nd that rmsincentives to patent are greater if the
innovation arrival rate is higher. This result helps explain why rms in hi-tech industries,
which feature by high innovation arrival rates, may choose patenting despite weak industry
patent protection. Finally, I show that an increase in the number of rms may cause patent-
ing to occur earlier or later, depending on the strength of patent protection, which suggests
that greater competition does not necessarily promote innovation information disclosure.
The analysis in this paper sheds light on the important policy issue of the socially optimal
level of patent protection. In the model, the arrivals of innovations are assumed to be
exogenously determined. Thus, the issue of ex-ante innovation incentives is not a concern.
A patent is viewed as a contract or agreement between society and the innovator in the sense
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that certain monopoly power is granted in exchange for innovation information disclosure.5 A
social planner faces the following trade-o¤ in choosing the optimal level of patent protection.
For a weak patent protection, early innovators are more likely to adopt secrecy. Thus, the
society will experience markets in which rms have strong market power until the time that
more rms innovate. To speed up the disclosure of innovation information, stronger patent
protection is necessary, although it is associated with a greater chance of a monopoly market.
I derive the socially optimal level of patent protection and show it to be lower with a higher
innovation arrival rate or a larger number of rms.
Section 6 considers a simple model with an endogenous innovation arrival rate. I employ
the framework of Loury (1979) and assume that rms incur an up-front R&D investment in
the rst stage that generates a steady ow of innovation arrivals over time. In the second
stage, each rm decides whether to patent when its innovation occurs. I argue that the results
from the model with the exogenous innovation arrival rate remain valid in the extended
model. Moreover, I explore how the strength of patent protection a¤ects the incentive to
innovate. In this model setting, there is a possibility that an increase in patent protection
can impede R&D investment.
A small body of literature has studied rmspatenting decisions under imperfect patent
protection. However, these studies typically assume away the possibility that rms com-
pete to patent identical or similar innovations (Gallini, 1992; Horstmann, MacDonald and
Slivinski, 1985; Anton and Yao, 2004). Anton and Yao (2004), for example, present a model
in which a rm with private information about the protability of an innovation chooses
between patenting and secrecy and also decides on the amount of innovation information to
disclose. In their model, patenting signals low innovation protability to a potential imitator.
The model in this paper involves no asymmetric information issues. Instead, by developing
a model with perfect information, I explore rmspatenting decisions under conditions of
imperfect patent protection and the possibility of multiple independent discoveries.
Kultti, Takalo and Toikka (2006, 2007) consider a situation in which multiple rms that
innovate independently choose between patenting and secrecy. However, there are notable
di¤erences between this paper and theirs. In their models, rms innovate simultaneously and
decide whether to patent based on the level of patent and secrecy protection. This paper
complements theirs in that it models independent discoveries that occur stochastically and
sequentially. In the present model, an early innovator decides whether to patent by taking
into account the strategies of later innovators.
This paper is also related to the literature on multiple patents and the defense of inde-
5See Denicolò and Franzoni (2004b) for discussions on the distinction between reward theory and
contract theoryof patents.
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pendent inventions (La Manna, MacLeod and de Meza, 1989; Shapiro, 2006; Denicolò and
Franzoni, 2004a, 2010). In this literature, the key issue is the optimal allocation of prizes
or the mechanisms by which these prizes are awarded in an innovation race. This paper has
a di¤erent focus, examining innovatorschoice between patenting and secrecy decisions in a
particular legal environment in which the patent system grants no prior user rights.
Choi (1990) and Erkal (2005) investigate decisions to patent from another interesting
and important angle. In a framework of cumulative innovation, they examine two options
for an innovator: to patent (and commercialize) the basic version of a product or to keep it
secret and work on developing an improved version. They assume perfect patent protection
and emphasize the competition among rms in the development of vertically di¤erentiated
products. This paper considers the situation of identical innovations (or horizontally similar
innovations) and probabilistic patent protection.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 conducts equilibrium analysis. Section 4 performs comparative statics. Section 5 derives
the socially optimal level of patent protection. Section 6 considers a simple model with an
endogenous innovation arrival rate. Section 7 concludes the paper. All proofs are relegated
to the Appendix.
2 The Model
Consider an industry with a xed number, n, of ex-ante identical rms. These rms are
about to discover a technology that is crucial to a cost-reduction process or to the develop-
ment of a new product.6 The discovery process for each rm is independent and identical,
and is determined by a Poisson process with an exogenous arrival rate, .7 There are three
reasons to focus on an exogenous innovation process. First, in a number of situations, a
creative idea is essential for an innovation to occur. Once the idea arrives, it can be turned
into an innovation at negligible cost. In addition, ideas are likely to arrive in a stochas-
tic fashion. Thus, the model ts certain innovation environments.8 Second, the primary
objective of this paper is to understand how rms make patenting decisions. Abstracting
from investment choices allows us to disentangle the trade-o¤s in the patenting decision in
a more transparent way. Third, the assumption of an exogenous innovation process serves
the purpose of separating patentsfunction to induce innovation information disclosure from
6For convenience, only one technology is considered. Alternatively, the rms could be about to discover
di¤erent but similar technologies that are likely to be covered by one patent.
7The Poisson process has been extensively used in the literature on the economics of innovation. See
Reinganum (1989) for a survey. Some researchers call  the hit rate or hazard rate.
8See Scotchmer (2004) and Erkal and Scotchmer (2009) for discussions on models of innovation ideas.
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that to provide ex-ante innovation incentives.
When a technology discovery occurs, the innovator decides whether to patent that tech-
nology or to keep it secret. To capture the fact that patent protection is probabilistic, in
line with Kultti, Takalo and Toikka (2007), I assume the following: with probability ; an
innovator who applies for patent protection is granted an innitely lived, perfectly e¤ective
property right on the technology; with probability 1 , patent protection is ine¤ective, the
technology becomes public, and other rms can access it. To simplify the analysis, the costs
associated with patenting are normalized to zero.9 By adopting secrecy, an innovator can
use the technology until another innovator successfully obtains e¤ective patent protection.
To focus on the e¤ect of multiple innovation discoveries, it is assumed that information on
the technology does not leak out if it is kept secret.10
Firms earn prots in an output market. Rather than relying on a specic form of com-
petition, I assume a general prot function that depends only on the number of producing
rms. In particular, let i be the instantaneous prot for each rm when i rms are pro-
ducing in the product market. It is assumed that i is strictly decreasing and convex in
i:11 Three possible scenarios may appear, each of which determines the number of producing
rms and their prots: (1) if patent protection is e¤ective, then the patentee earns 1 and
the other rms earn no prots; (2) if patent protection is ine¤ective, then all rms produce
and each earns n; and (3) if i rms discover the technology and all of them opt for secrecy,
then each of the i rms earns i, and the others earn no prots.
Issues of asymmetric information are not considered here, and whether a rm has dis-
covered the technology is common knowledge. The timing of the model is shown in Figure
1. As rms are ex-ante identical, without loss of generality, they are indexed by the order of
discoveries. Let innovator j (or rm j) be the jth rm that discovers the technology, where
j 2 N and N = f1; 2;    ; ng. Time is continuous. Period j begins when innovator j discov-
ers the technology and ends when innovator j + 1 discovers it. At the beginning of period
j, innovator j decides whether to apply for patent protection if no patent has previously
been granted. If innovator j chooses to apply for a patent, then nature determines whether
the patent protection is e¤ective. Alternatively, innovator j can keep the technology secret.
In this case, the model moves on to period j + 1; in which innovator j + 1 discovers the
technology and decides whether to apply for a patent.
9The model can easily incorporate the case of a positive patenting cost,  ; by scaling down the prot
associated with the patenting strategy by  .
10Thus, a rm can access the technology information only if it discovers the technology itself or if patent
protection is ine¤ective.
11A simple example is Cournot competition with linear market demand and a constant marginal production
cost.
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Figure 1 : Timing of the game
The equilibrium concept in this model is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
Given that no previous patent has been granted, an innovator, taking into account the opti-
mal strategies of subsequent innovators, chooses between patenting and secrecy to maximize
its expected prot. In equilibrium, the innovatorspatenting decisions are mapped from N
to fP; Sg; where P and S stand for patenting and secrecy, respectively.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In deciding whether to patent, a rm compares the expected prots from the patenting and
secrecy strategies. As innovator j makes its patenting decision at the beginning of period j;
the future prot streams should be discounted as a present value.
I rst consider the expected prot for innovator j if it chooses to apply for patent protec-
tion conditional upon all previous innovators adopting secrecy. With probability ; innovator
j is awarded with e¤ective patent protection, thereby reaping a monopoly prot of 1. With
probability 1 ; patent protection is ine¤ective, and innovator j earns a prot equal to n.
Hence, the expected prot for innovator j if it patents is
p =
Z 1
0
[1 + (1  )n]e rtdt
=
1
r
[1 + (1  )n] : (1)
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Note that p is invariant with the rank of discoveries and does not depend on the patenting
strategies of subsequent innovators. The reason is that the uncertainty over patent protection
is fully removed once a rm chooses to patent.
If innovator j adopts secrecy, then its expected prot depends on the strategies of subse-
quent innovators. Let s(jjh) (h > j) denote the expected prot for innovator j if it adopts
secrecy, where h is the rst innovator after j that chooses to patent. Thus, s(j) = s(jjj+1)
is the expected prot if innovator j opts for secrecy, given that the next innovator chooses to
patent. s(j) originates from two sources. One is the expected prot associated with secrecy
protection in period j, and the other is the expected prot from period j+1 and subsequent
periods. Given that the next innovator chooses to patent, innovator j earns prots from
period j + 1 and subsequent periods only if patent protection is ine¤ective, which occurs
with probability 1  . It is straightforward to show that
s(j) =
Z 1
0
e (n j)t

j +  (n  j) (1  )
Z 1
t
ne
 rsds

e rtdt
=
j +  (n  j) (1  ) nr
r +  (n  j)
= [1  x (j)] j
r
+ (1  )x (j) n
r
; (2)
where
x (j) =
 (n  j)
r +  (n  j) ; (3)
which can be viewed as the discounting adjusted probability that the j + 1th innovator
succeeds.12
s(j) is rewritten as
s(j) =
j
r

r +
h
(1  ) n
j
i
 (n  j)
r +  (n  j) : (4)
As j decreases with j and (1  ) nj < 1; we immediately have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 s(j) strictly decreases with j.
Now, consider innovator js patenting decision if the next innovator chooses to patent.
To avoid mixed strategies, I assume that a rm chooses to adopt secrecy if both patenting
and secrecy strategies yield the same expected prot. Clearly, innovator j chooses to patent
if
p > s(j): (5)
12I thank a referee for pointing out this mathematical arrangement and its economic interpretation.
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Dene
j =
j n
1
1 x(j) n
for j = 1; :::; n: (6)
By (1) and (2), (5) becomes
 > j: (7)
Thus, j can be interpreted as the incentive for innovator j to patent if the next innovator
also chooses to patent. A smaller j implies a greater incentive to patent.
By implicit di¤erentiation,
@j
@j
=
@s(j)=@j
@p=@j   @s(j)=@j < 0; (8)
noting that @p=@j > 0 by (1), @s(j)=@j < 0 by (2), and @s(j)=@j < 0 by Lemma 1.
Thus, conditional on the next innovator choosing to patent, a later innovator has a greater
incentive to patent.
Next, I turn to the case in which the optimal strategy for innovator j + 1 is to adopt
secrecy.
Lemma 2 If choosing secrecy over patenting is optimal for innovator j + 1; then the same
strategy has to be optimal for innovator j.
The key to understanding this result is to realize that innovator j earns greater prot
than innovator j + 1 when both adopt secrecy, regardless of the strategies of subsequent
innovators. Moreover, both innovators receive the same prot from patenting. Therefore, if
innovator j + 1 nds it optimal to choose secrecy over patenting; then innovator j should
also nd the same strategy to be optimal.
Lemma 2 allows us to focus on analysis that is on the equilibrium path. If it is optimal
for innovator j to choose to patent, then innovator j + 1 will choose to patent if innovator
j has sub-optimally opted for secrecy. One immediate result that follows from Lemma 2 is
that if innovator j + 1 optimally chooses secrecy, then all previous innovators will also nd
it optimal to choose secrecy in equilibrium. I now describe the equilibrium of the model.
Proposition 1 Let 0 = 1: Given the level of patent protection , there exists a unique
m 2 N such that m <   m 1. In equilibrium, innovator m chooses to patent, whereas
previous innovators (if any) adopt secrecy.
Depending on the strength of patent protection, the innovation arrival rate, the number
of rms and the timing of discoveries, rms may choose di¤erent means to protect their
innovations. Two scenarios may occur in equilibrium. First, the rst innovator chooses to
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patent. Second, rms that innovate early opt for secrecy, whereas only a su¢ ciently late
innovator chooses to patent.
The following example illustrates Proposition 1.
Example 1 Let n = 3;  = 0:1; and r = 0:2: Moreover, assume linear market demand,
P = a   bQ; and constant marginal cost, c: By (6), 1 = 0:43; 2 = 0:16; and 3 = 0:
Therefore, if  > 1; then in equilibrium, innovator 1 patents. If 1   > 2; then in
equilibrium, innovator 1 adopts secrecy, and innovator 2 patents. If 2   > 3; then in
equilibrium, innovators 1 and 2 adopt secrecy, and innovator 3 patents.
This section concludes by showing how innovatorsexpected prots depend on the order
of discoveries.
Proposition 2 Innovatorsexpected prots decrease with the order of discoveries.
4 Comparative Statics
This section examines how changes in the strength of patent protection, the innovation arrival
rate and the number of rms a¤ect the incentives to patent and the timing of patenting.
Proposition 1 has shown that there is a unique m = m(; ; n); such that innovator m
patents and previous innovators (if any) opt for secrecy. Dene (; ; n) as the proportion
of rms that adopt secrecy:
(; ; n) =
m(; ; n)  1
n
: (9)
As the industry innovation arrival rate during period i is (n   i); the expected length of
period i is
Ti (n; ) =
1
(n  i):
Dene T (; ; n) as the expected time that patenting occurs:
T (; ; n) =
m(;;n) 1X
i=1
Ti (n; ) : (10)
I rst show the e¤ect of a change in the level of patent protection :
Proposition 3 m(; ; n), (; ; n) and T (; ; n) decrease with .
The intuition is straightforward. Strengthening patent protection directly increases the
prot that arises from patenting. At the same time, it reduces that arising from secrecy
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because subsequent innovators have a greater chance of obtaining e¤ective patent protection.
Therefore, a higher  encourages rms to choose patenting and thus advances the timing of
patenting.
I next examine the e¤ect of a change in the innovation arrival rate :
Proposition 4 m(; ; n); (; ; n) and T (; ; n) decrease with .
An increase in the innovation arrival rate has no e¤ect on the prot that stems from
patenting. However, it does shorten the duration of the period in which an innovator enjoys
the prot that stems from secrecy because discoveries by rival rms arrive more quickly.
Thus, the prot from secrecy decreases with . Consequently, innovators have greater in-
centives to patent, and patenting occurs earlier.
The nding that rms prefer patenting under a larger  may help explain why rms in hi-
tech industries nd patenting attractive despite relatively weak industry patent protection.
Independent discoveries are likely to occur frequently in these industries. Hence, expecting
that their rivals will soon discover the technology, rms nd secrecy protection of little value
and choose to patent even if patent protection is weak.
It is easy to show that given a certain patent protection level, there always exists a su¢ -
ciently large  such that the rst innovator applies for patent protection. When discoveries
occur almost simultaneously, that is, !1, patenting is the dominant strategy.
Finally, I examine how the degree of market competition a¤ects the incentives to patent
and the timing of patenting.
Proposition 5 There exists a ~j such that as n increases, innovator js incentive to patent
is higher (lower) if j < ~j
 
j > ~j

: Consequently, there exists an ~ such that as n increases,
patenting occurs earlier (later) if  > ~ ( < ~).
The key to understanding Proposition 5 is that an increase in the number of rms a¤ects
the prots arising from both patenting and secrecy. On the one hand, the prot from
patenting decreases because more rms produce in the output market if patent protection
is ine¤ective. This is the free ride e¤ect. Note that the magnitude of this e¤ect is the same
for early and late innovators. On the other hand, an increase in the number of rms also
decreases the prot from secrecy because the next discovery occurs sooner. This is the racing
e¤ect. However, compared to late innovators, early innovators are a¤ected more signicantly,
as they face more potential competitors racing for discoveries. In other words, the racing
e¤ect is more prominent for early innovators. As shown in Figure 2, the incentives for early
(late) innovators to patent increase (decrease) as j becomes lower (higher).
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Figure 2
An increase in the number of rms may cause patenting to occur earlier or later, de-
pending on the strength of patent protection. When patent protection is strong, an early
innovator patents in equilibrium. As a greater number of rms strengthens the patenting
incentive of the early innovator, patenting occurs earlier. When patent protection is weak,
a late innovator patents in equilibrium. In this case, an increase in the number of rms
weakens the late innovators incentive to patent, which causes patenting to occur later. One
important implication of Proposition 5 is that an increase in competition does not necessarily
promote innovation information disclosure.
5 Socially Optimal Patent Protection
When an innovator considers its patenting and secrecy options, it does not internalize the
e¤ects on consumer surplus and the prots of its rivals. This section addresses the following
question: given rmspatenting strategies, what is the optimal level of patent protection
that maximizes social welfare?
There are two distinct perspectives on the function of patents. The rst considers patents
to be rewards for innovators. Without patent protection, innovations can be easily imitated.
Thus, rms may be unable to reap su¢ cient prots to cover the costs associated with an
innovation. Knowing this, rms may simply not to invest. As a result, innovation will not
occur. In this view, the main goal of patents is to provide su¢ cient ex-ante innovation
incentives.
This paper focuses on the second perspective regarding the function of patents. Following
Denicolò and Franzoni (2004b), a patent is viewed as a contract or agreement between society
12
and an innovator whereby the former a¤ords the latter an exclusive right in exchange for
innovation information disclosure. In this view, the main function of patents is to induce
information disclosure after innovations occur. In the model adopted here, innovations follow
a random process with an exogenous arrival rate. This structure allows us to abstract from
the role of patents in providing an ex-ante innovation incentive and to focus on their function
of inducing innovation information disclosure.13
Let Sk be the instantaneous social welfare when k rms produce in the output market.14
Assume that Sk strictly increases with k. Suppose that, given , innovator m patents in
equilibrium. Dene total social welfare, TS(); as the sum of discounted instantaneous social
welfare:
TS() =
1
r
n 1S1
+
1
r
n 2(1  n 1)S2
+   
+
1
r
n m+1(1  n m+2)    (1  n 1)Sm 1
+
1
r
(1  n m+1)(1  n m+2)    (1  n 1)[S1 + (1  )Sn]; (11)
where n j = rr+(n j) : The rst m   1 lines are the discounted social welfare in the rst
m 1 periods when early innovators opt for secrecy, and the last line is the discounted social
welfare when innovator m patents. A social planners objective function is
max
2[0;1]
TS(): (12)
The next proposition states that the socially optimal level of patent protection induces
the rst innovator to patent.
Proposition 6 The socially optimal level of patent protection  is such that it is only
su¢ cient to induce the rst innovator to patent. That is,  = 1.
The optimal level of patent protection involves a trade-o¤. On the one hand, innovation
information disclosure benets society because, with some degree of probability, other rms
may utilize the innovation, which leads to a more competitive output market and thus
13It should be noted that the function of patents to provide an ex-ante innovation incentive is equally
important, and an extensive body of literature is devoted to exploring the design of patent systems that
reward innovators and encourage R&D e¤ort.
14The instantaneous social welfare is the sum of consumer and producer surplus.
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boosts social welfare. On the other hand, an innovator will not disclose information unless
it receives su¢ cient compensation, which implies that su¢ ciently strong patent protection
must be granted to trigger information disclosure. However, stronger patent protection is
associated with a greater chance of a monopoly, which diminishes social welfare. Under
the model setup in this paper, the welfare gain from early innovation information disclosure
outweighs the welfare loss resulting from a potential monopoly. In addition, as long as
the patent protection is su¢ ciently strong to induce the rst innovator to patent, a further
increase in patent protection merely increases the chance of a monopoly and, thus, reduces
social welfare.
By denition, 1 = rr+ < 1: Hence, from (6), 1 < 1: Corollary 1 follows:
Corollary 1 Full patent protection ( = 1) is never socially optimal when n > 1:
A monopoly rm demands full patent protection in exchange for revealing innovation
information because it faces no potential threat. The situation changes in an oligopoly
market. If the rst innovator opts for secrecy, it could potentially be excluded by a later
innovator that obtains a patent with e¤ective protection. Thus, the level of patent protection
that induces the rst innovator to disclose information is lower than full protection.
Finally, by (6) and (3), it is straightforward to show the following proposition.
Proposition 7  decreases, respectively, with  and n.
Proposition 7 implies that the optimal level of patent protection varies with the nature
of an innovation and the degree of competition in an industry. More specically, the optimal
level of patent protection is lower if the innovation arrival rate is higher or the number of rms
is larger. For a higher innovation arrival rate or a larger number of rms, by Propositions 4
and 5, the rst innovator receives less prot from secrecy and thus demands a lower level of
patent protection in exchange for the disclosure of innovation information.
6 Endogenous Innovation Arrival Rate
In this section, I consider a simple model extension that incorporates an endogenous inno-
vation arrival rate. I employ the framework in Loury (1979) and assume that rms incur
an up-front R&D investment that generates a steady ow of innovation arrivals over time.
The extended model involves two stages. In stage 1, each rm chooses an R&D investment
level, c
 
i

; which yields innovation arrival rate i. Assume that c
 
i

is increasing and
strictly convex in i. In stage 2, rms innovate stochastically and sequentially, and each rm
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decides whether to apply for patent protection. As rms are ex-ante identical, I consider
the symmetric equilibrium in which each rm chooses the same level of R&D investment,
denoted as c (), in the rst stage.
Note that the second stage in the extended model is identical to the basic model in
Section 2 except that the innovation arrival rate, ; is endogenously determined by the
R&D investment, which is chosen by rms in the rst stage. Therefore, by the principle
of backward induction, the analysis of rms decisions to patent remains valid after the
innovation arrival rate is determined. More specically, in the second stage, rms that
innovate early are more inclined to choose secrecy, whereas those that innovate late have a
stronger tendency to patent. Consequently, in equilibrium, early innovators adopt secrecy
and only a su¢ ciently late innovator chooses to patent. Moreover, as rms make identical
investments in the symmetric equilibrium, their expected prots decrease with the order of
discoveries. Furthermore, an increase in patent protection bolsters rmstendency to patent
and causes patenting to occur earlier.
I next explore rmsR&D decisions in stage 1. Let V iW (V
i
L) be the present value of
future prots from succeeding (not succeeding) in the ith period of stage 2.15 Suppose that
innovator m chooses to patent whereas previous innovators adopt secrecy in equilibrium.
Given that other rms choose ; a rm chooses  to maximize:16
V () =
Z 1
0
e [+(n 1)
]t V 1W + (n  1)V 1L () e rtdt  c ()
=
V 1W + (n  1)V 1L ()
r + + (n  1)   c () (13)
where
V iL =
V i+1W + (n  i  1)V i+1L
r + + (n  i  1) i = 1; :::;m  1
V mL =
1
r
(1  )n
V iW = s (ijm) i = 1; :::;m  1
V mW = p:
To better understand these expressions, consider the expected payo¤ for a rm that enters
in the i + 1th period. With a successful innovation, which occurs with instantaneous prob-
15Recall that stage 2 consists of n periods and that period j begins when rm j innovates and ends when
rm j + 1 innovates.
16Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between R&D investment cost c
 
i

and innovation
arrival rate i. For convenience, i is selected as the choice variable.
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ability 
r++(n i 1) ; the rm receives V
i+1
W : If one of its rivals innovates, which occurs with
instantaneous probability (n i 1)

r++(n i 1) ; then the payo¤ to the rm is V
i
L () :
First-order conditions, allowing  = ; yield
rV 1W + (n  1)
h
V 1W   V 1L () + (r + n) @V
1
L(
)
@
i
(r + n)2
  c0 () = 0 (14)
and
@V iL (
)
@
=
rV i+1W + (n  i  1)
n
V i+1W   V i+1L () + [r + (n  i)] @V
i+1
L (
)
@
o
[r + (n  i)]2 :
(15)
The equilibrium  is implicitly dened by (14) and (15).17
How does the incentive to innovate respond to stronger patent protection? In general,
stronger patent protection provides greater rewards to innovators and thus increases the
incentive to innovate. This conventional wisdom continues to hold in the model if the
initial patent protection is su¢ ciently strong. However, in this papers model setting, R&D
investment is generally not monotone in the strength of patent protection, although I am
unable to show this analytically. To illustrate, consider a simple case of two rms. If the
initial patent protection is strong, then a higher  induces a higher . The reasoning is
straightforward: stronger patent protection provides greater potential rewards for the rst
successful innovator to patent an innovation. Thus, the rms in the patent race have a
greater incentive to innovate. Interestingly, if patent protection is initially weak, then an
increase in  may lead to a lower : To see this, note that if the initial patent protection
is weak, then, in equilibrium, the rst innovator adopts secrecy and the second innovator
chooses to patent. A marginal increase in patent protection, as long as it does not induce
the rst innovator to patent, has no e¤ect on the payo¤ to the rst innovator. However, it
does increase that to the second innovator. In other words, the payo¤ di¤erence between the
rst and second innovator becomes smaller, which weakens the incentive to invest in R&D
in the rst stage.18
17Consistent with the previous literature on patent races, the overall R&D investment is excessive compared
to the cooperative equilibrium. The economic intuition underlying this result is that each rm ignores its
impact on its rivalspayo¤s, and, consequently, there is too much duplication of e¤ort in the noncooperative
equilibrium.
18Suppose that n = 2 and output market competition is Bertrand fashion, which implies 2 = 0. Moreover,
assume that r = 0:2; 1 = 1; and c () = 
2:By (6), 1 = 0:31: Thus, in equilibrium, rm 1 patents if  > 1.
Substituting (15) into (14), the rst-order condition becomes  (r + )   2r (r + 2)2 = 0: If   1;
then rm 1 adopts secrecy, and rm 2 patents. The rst-order condition becomes  3 + r (1 + )2 +
16
7 Conclusion
The heterogeneity of the choices to patent or to maintain secrecy are well documented. I
have shown how these choices may arise as a market equilibrium in a legal environment
characterized by imperfect patent protection and no prior user rights. I have also shown
how innovatorsincentives to patent depend on the nature of innovation and the degree of
market competition. A focus on the function of patents to induce innovation information
disclosure reveals that the optimal level of patent protection is lower when the innovation
arrival rate is higher or the number of rms is larger.
For future research, it would be interesting to examine how rmspatenting decisions
depend on the nature of innovations and the degree of market competition in a framework
of cumulative innovation.19 It would also be interesting to extend the model to a vertical
industry structure and ascertain how the presence of vertical integration a¤ects an upstream
rms incentive to patent.20
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. As the model assumes complete information, an innovator correctly anticipates the
strategies of subsequent innovators. Suppose it is expected that innovator h (h > j + 1)
will apply for patent protection at time Th when it discovers the technology. In addition,
denote  (sj) as the prot distribution for innovator j up to time sj and  (sj+1) as the prot
distribution for innovator j + 1 up to time sj+1: Note that at each point in time sj = sj+1,
and  (sj) rst-order stochastically dominates  (sj+1) : Thus, the expected prot that arises
from secrecy protection for innovator j; s(jjh) =
R Th
0
 (sj) +
R Th
0
(1  )n; is higher than
that for innovator j + 1; s(jjh) =
R Th
0
 (sj+1) +
R Th
0
(1  )n. Given that innovator j + 1
optimally chooses secrecy, it follows that s(j + 1jh) > p: Hence, s(jjh) > p: That is,
innovator j opts for secrecy.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. By (8), fjgj2N is a strictly decreasing sequence. Moreover, by (6), N = 0: Thus,
[0; 1] is divided into non-overlapping intervals. For any given  2 [0; 1], a unique m 2 N
r2 (2 + )+r3 2r (r + )2 (r + 2)2 = 0: Numerical analysis suggests that if   0:31; then a higher
 induces a higher ; if  < 0:31; then a higher  leads to a lower :
19See Green and Scotchmer (1995) and Erkal (2005) for models of cumulative innovation.
20See Chen and Sappington (2010) for recent work on innovation in vertically related markets.
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exists such that m <   m 1.
To show the second half of the proposition, I use backward induction by considering
the choice of the last innovator (innovator n). When comparing the prot from patenting
strategy, p; to that from secrecy strategy, s(n); it can be shown that s(n) = 1rn <
1
r
[1+(1 )n] = p: That is, the last innovator will choose to apply for patent protection.
This is because secrecy provides no extra benets because all of the other rms have already
discovered the technology. Given that innovator n will apply for patent protection, I now
consider the choice of innovator n 1: If m = n; then  < n 1; which implies that innovator
n   1 will choose secrecy. By Lemma 2, innovator j (j < m), if any, opts for secrecy. If
m < n; then  > n 1: Thus, innovator n 1 chooses to apply for patent protection. As fjg
is strictly decreasing with j; it can be shown that, for  > m; innovator j (j  m) chooses
to apply for patent protection. In addition, as   m 1; it follows that innovator m   1
chooses secrecy over patenting. By Lemma 2, it is straightforward to show that innovator j
(j < m) opts for secrecy.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Suppose that innovatorm applies for patent protection. By Proposition 1, innovator
i (i < m) opts for secrecy. By Lemma 2, s(jjm) > s(j+1jm): Hence, the expected prots
decrease with j when j < m. In addition, the expected prot for innovator m is p:
Furthermore, innovator m   1 opts for secrecy, which implies s(m   1) > p: Finally, the
prot for innovator j (j > m) is
1
r
(1  )n < 1
r
[1 + (1  )n] = p:
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Suppose that ^ > . Dene m^ = m(^; ; n) and m = m(; ; n). In equilibrium,
we have m <   m 1. It follows that m  ^. As a change in  has no e¤ect on j; and
since ^ 2 (m^; m^ 1]; we have m  m^. By (8), m^  m. Moreover, dene ^ = (^; ; n)
and  = (; ; n). By (9), ^  . Furthermore, let T^ = T (^; ; n) and T = T (; ; n). By
(10), we have T^  T .
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. From equation (6), j increases in n j. Therefore, j decreases in ; as n j
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decreases in . Hence, if ^ > , then j(^) < j(). For any given , we have m() <  
m 1(). It follows that  > m(^). Therefore, for any given ^, m(; ^; n)  m(; ; n). It
follows that (^; ; n)  (; ; n) by (9) and T (; ^; n)  T (; ; n) by (10).
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Step 1: I show that for any given j; there exists a cuto¤ value,
j =
r (1   j) (n   n+1)
1 [j   n   (n  j) (n   n+1)] ; (16)
such that j increases with n if  < j, but decreases with n if  > j:
To see this, take the di¤erence between j (n) and j (n+ 1) : Note that x (j) = 1 n j.
By (6),
j (n)  j (n+ 1) =
(j   n)

1
n+1 j
  n+1

  (j   n+1)

1
n j
  n


1
n j
  n

1
n+1 j
  n+1
 :
Clearly, the denominator on the right-hand side of the equation is positive because n j < 1:
Substituting n j into the numerator on the right-hand side and rearranging terms, we have
sign [j (n)  j (n+ 1)] = sign [(j   n)  (n  j) (n   n+1)] 1
r
 (1   j) (n   n+1) :
Dene j as in (16). If  > j; then [(j   n)  (n  j) (n   n+1)] 1r  (1   j) (n   n+1) >
0; which implies j (n) > j (n+ 1) : If  < j; then [(j   n)  (n  j) (n   n+1)] 1r  
(1   j) (n   n+1) < 0; which implies j (n) < j (n+ 1) :
Step 2: I show that j increases with j:
It is straightforward to show that 1 = 0: To see that fjg increases in j; note that
j   j+1 = r (1   j) (n   n+1)
1 [j   n   (n  j) (n   n+1)]  
r (1   j+1) (n   n+1)
1 [j+1   n   (n  j   1) (n   n+1)]
=   f(1   j) [j+1   n   (n  j   1) (n   n+1)]  (1   j+1) [j   n   (n  j) (n   n+1)]g ;
where  = r(n n+1)
1[j n (n j)(n n+1)][j+1 n (n j 1)(n n+1)] > 0: Thus,
sign (j   j+1)
= sign f  (1   j) [j   j+1   (n   n+1)]  (j   j+1) [(j   n)  (n  j) (n   n+1)]g :
However, j   n   (j+1   n+1) = j   j+1   (n   n+1) > 0 and (j   n) = j  
19
j+1+j+1 j+2+   +n 1 n > (n  j) (n 1   n) > (n  j) (n   n+1) : Therefore,
sign (j   j+1) < 0: That is, fjg increases with j:
Step 3: For any given ; as n increases, there exists a k () ; such that j (n) > j (n+ 1)
for j < k and j (n) < j (n+ 1) for j  k. Dene ~ = k (n+ 1) : If  > ~; then
m (n)  m (n+ 1) ; which implies T (n)  T (n+ 1) : If  < ~; then m (n) < m (n+ 1) ;
which implies T (n) < T (n+ 1) :
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. First, I show that total social welfare can be increased if a reduction in  results in
the same m in equilibrium. Suppose that ^ > ; but they lead to the same equilibrium m.
By (11),
TS()  TS(^) = 1
r
(1  n m+1)(1  n m+2)    (1  n 1)[S1 + (1  )Sn]
 1
r
(1  n m+1)(1  n m+2)    (1  n 1)[^S1 + (1  ^)Sn]
=
1
r
(1  n m+1)(1  n m+2)    (1  n 1)(  ^)(S1   Sn) > 0:
Therefore, total social welfare can be increased by reducing ^ to .
Second, by the above result, the set of possible  leading to total social welfare maxi-
mization can be greatly reduced. More specically, total social welfare maximization occurs
when  is only su¢ cient to induce a switch in m. In other words, the optimal level of patent
protection occurs at one of the fjgj2N . Hence, it is necessary only to compare n possible
equilibrium outcomes. The social planners problem is simplied to
max
2
()
TS() where 
() = fj; j 2 Ng: (17)
The social planner chooses an j to maximize total social welfare. However, each j is
uniquely associated with an m. Therefore, it is as though the social planner chooses m to
maximize total social welfare.
Third, from Proposition 1, innovator 1 applies for patent protection if  > 1. We have
TS(1) =
1
r
[1S1 + (1  1)Sn]:
Next, consider  = j for any given j > 1. Note that S1 < S2 <    < Sn: Hence,
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S1 + (1  )Sn < Sn: We have
TS(j) <
1
r
n 1S1 +
1
r
n 2(1  n 1)Sn + :::+ 1
r
n m+1(1  n m+2)    (1  n 1)Sn
+
1
r
(1  n m+1)(1  n m+2)    (1  n 1)Sn
=
1
r
[n 1S1 + (1  n 1)Sn]:
As 0 < n 1 < 1, 1 = 1 n1
n 1 n
= 1 n
1 n 1n n 1 < n 1: Therefore, TS(1) > TS(j) for
any given j > 1: This completes the proof.
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